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Introduction 
 
During the last twenty years, there has been a significant increase in the 
attention given to issues associated with ‘modern slavery’, human traffick-
ing and forced labour (Anderson, 2015; FRA, 2015; Gadd and Broad, 
2018). A range of public, political, and academic attention (within and be-
yond criminology) has led to significant developments of the ways in 
which these issues are conceptualised and enforced against (GLA, 2015; 
HM Government, 2015). However, the anti-trafficking framework tends to 
consist of the so-called ‘3Ps’ – prevention, protection and prosecution, re-
ferring to the need to address root causes, improve victim protection, and 
to hold perpetrators criminally accountable (Ollus, 2015). While this em-
phasis has arguably improved overall awareness of the issues and led to 
some policy improvements, it tends to oversimplify the problems by blam-
ing individuals as the key drivers of exploitation (LeBaron et al., 2015). 
This is a concern because it neglects the role of the state as being respon-
sible for facilitating exploitation through its regulation of labour markets, 
border controls, immigration policy, and social policy more widely – rather 
than simply being a neutral or benign actor that ‘rescues’ victims from ex-
ploitation (LeBaron, 2015). 
 The purpose of this chapter is to move beyond the traditional anti-traf-
ficking agenda, and instead pay greater emphasis to the role of legitimate 
businesses, supply chains and markets, as well as the way they are regu-
lated, thereby facilitating exploitation and harm. In doing so, it adopts a 
criminological lens of harm, which asserts that a large number of actions 
and omissions associated with corporations are neither criminalised nor 
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prosecuted. From a worker perspective, this lack of accountability does not 
make the harm they experience any less important. This chapter contains a 
number of sections in order to elaborate on the role of businesses and mar-
kets, along with the harm that can emerge from them. First, an outline of 
harm in relation to criminology is provided. Second, key issues related to 
human trafficking are explored. Third, some underlying explanations for 
harmful labour practices are signposted, including the role of businesses, 
supply chains, and the regulatory context. It seeks to address the key ques-
tion of ‘how do some supply chains facilitate harmful labour practices?’, 
drawing on supporting examples where appropriate. The intention here is 
not to provide a full account of these challenges, but to illustrate recent key 
developments within the topic areas. 
 
 
Crime and harm in the workplace 
 
When considering the workplace, workers are subject to a number of vul-
nerabilities that may result in labour exploitation or harm. While this chap-
ter focuses primarily on workers, a broader range of harms against busi-
nesses, employers, consumers, animals, and the environment may emerge 
from deviant actions within the workplace. These wider concerns are well 
grounded in previous work on corporate, organisational and white-collar 
crime, such as food fraud (Lord et al., 2017), toxic oil spills (Slapper and 
Tombs, 1999), and the Libor scandal (van Erp et al., 2015). The purpose 
of this section is to examine the notions of crime and harm, especially with 
regards to actions or omissions that have consequences in the workplace. 
 The terms ‘labour exploitation’ and ‘harm’ are complex and require 
some unpacking for the purposes of this discussion. While there is no uni-
versally accepted definition of labour exploitation, ‘severe exploitation’ is 
typically understood as criminalised actions or processes, including human 
trafficking and forced labour (FRA, 2015) – increasingly referred to as 
modern slavery. Other forms of non-criminalised exploitation such as un-
derpayment or unfair dismissal may be covered by regulatory or civil law 
– sometimes referred to as ‘labour abuse’ or routine exploitation (Davies, 
2018; France, 2016). If taking a broader sociological or even a Marxist 
view, exploitation can be understood as occurring beyond the scope of 
criminal and civil law – in the absence of formal sanctions (Scott, 2017). 
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Terms such as ‘lawful but awful’ and ‘3D’ (dirty, difficult, dangerous) 
work are used to refer to issues such as long working hours in low-paid 
work, physical exhaustion, and degrading treatment by employers. These 
practices are more controversial since they arguably occur in most occupa-
tions in some form, and lack any formal legal sanction. Rather than trying 
to resolve the tension between these competing definitions, this chapter 
acknowledges the spectrum of exploitation alluded to above, but refers to 
a broader criminological perspective of ‘harm’ as a means to frame the 
discussion. 
 Like labour exploitation, harm is a problematic concept. While harm is 
a well-grounded subject in disciplines such as law and philosophy, it has 
only recently gained significant attention within criminology (Hillyard et 
al., 2004; Paoli and Greenfield, 2015; Pemberton, 2015). Greenfield and 
Paoli (2013: 864) define harm as ‘breaches of stakeholders’ legitimate in-
terests’, referring to functional (physical and psychological), material, rep-
utational, and privacy harms. As part of their typology, harm can (i) range 
from minor, rare, and momentary occurrences to severe, frequent, and 
long-lasting consequences; (ii) affect individuals, private and public sector 
entities, as well as the environment (physical and social) (Greenfield and 
Paoli, 2013). 
 Alternatively, some critical criminologists assert that criminology is 
limited when addressing ‘harm’ that is not state defined, i.e. harm that fre-
quently occurs beyond the scope of criminal justice systems and formal 
sanctions, such as air pollution and poverty. They argue that ‘social harm’ 
or ‘zemiology’2 should be a discipline in its own right in order to study a 
wider range of harms – therefore beyond the confines of criminology 
(Pemberton, 2015). While non-criminalised responses to certain incidents 
(e.g. high levels of air pollution, poor health and safety practices) may be 
intended to minimise the number of new criminal-legal court cases, the 
social harm perspective intends to make such cases the focal point of anal-
ysis, arguing that it is precisely these issues that risk being overlooked by 
society, despite the role that corporations and states have in facilitating 
them. For instance, an employer who violates safety standards that results 
in a workplace death or severe injury may be regarded by employers and 
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the wider public as an ‘accident’ whereby ‘lessons need to be learned’, 
rather than a criminal action deserving guilt and punishment. 
 The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve these tensions between 
crime and harm – indeed, it is recognised here that such a resolution is 
highly unlikely regardless of how much attention is paid to them. The def-
inition adopted for the purposes of this chapter is based on Greenfield and 
Paoli’s (2013) work, who as noted above, define harm as breaches of stake-
holders’ legitimate interests. Stakeholders, according to their definition, 
may consist of individuals, businesses, other institutions, as well as the 
physical and social environment (Greenfield and Paoli, 2013). This chapter 
does not argue for ‘abandoning’ criminology, albeit it recognises the value 
of a social harm approach in drawing attention to wrongdoing that fre-
quently occurs.  
 Having problematised the theoretical notion of harm, it is important to 
consider how this may be applied to the context of the workplace. In using 
Greenfield and Paoli’s (2013) framework of harm, it is possible to consider 
harm to individuals, private and public sector entities, as well as the envi-
ronment (physical and social). Although this chapter does not conduct a 
systematic harm ‘assessment’ in line with Greenfield and Paoli’s research 
due to the lack of empirical evidence, harms can be identified from existing 
research and developments from the harm agenda. Here, harms affecting 
workers, businesses, the government, and physical environment are dis-
cussed. This discussion is certainly not exhaustive, but provides some il-
lustrative examples of how different groups with potentially competing in-
terests can be harmed. 
 Workers are subject to numerous harms within the workplace, including 
labour exploitation and forms of ‘modern slavery’ (discussed further in the 
next section), health and safety problems, and in extreme cases, death. 
Tombs and Whyte (2007) assert that the blame for workplace injuries is 
frequently placed on workers, or presented as unavoidable accidents; 
whereas in many cases, blame arguably lies with employers and are pre-
ventable incidents. The result is that responsibility tends to be pinned on 
individual workers, rather than being seen as an organisational problem 
where employers are not ensuring appropriate safety standards. Regulatory 
bodies, while they tend to build up specific expertise, they may lack the 
resources and remit to effectively hold businesses accountable for prevent-
ing and reacting to workplace injuries – at least in the UK context. For 
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instance, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA) can only 
licence labour providers in the agri-food sector, which excludes other vul-
nerable sectors such as construction and social care.  
 An issue that is increasingly on the public agenda is that of sexual har-
assment in the workplace, with UK estimates suggesting that approxi-
mately 40% of women are affected by unwanted sexual advances while at 
work (House of Commons, 2018: 7). This can be particularly problematic 
if the advances are from senior colleagues who have the authority to dis-
miss or promote workers, or at least make their working lives more difficult 
for them. The issues of workplace injuries and sexual harassment, then, 
both suggest forms of physical and psychological harm to individuals in 
line with Greenfield and Paoli’s definition.   
 
 
Shifts from modern slavery to labour exploitation 
 
The issues of labour exploitation and ‘modern slavery’ have received a 
significant increase in attention during the last 20 years, especially since 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) was 
adopted. The UNTOC provides a contemporary framework for member 
states who ratify it to develop their responses to human trafficking. Alt-
hough there were initiatives and international agreements pre-dating UN-
TOC, such as the 1926 Slavery Convention, UNTOC represented a shift in 
emphasis from regarding human trafficking as solely a human rights issue, 
towards the sphere of transnational organised crime. In recent years, legis-
lation has increased on the issues of human trafficking and ‘modern slav-
ery’, including the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2012, 
the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015, as well as an increasing number of 
specialist NGOs, charities and other interest groups. However, there are a 
number of concerns with regards to the ‘modern slavery’ agenda, both in 
definitional scope and with the practical issues of implementation and re-
sponses. 
 Modern slavery is commonly accepted as an umbrella term for severe 
and (usually) criminalised forms of sexual and/or labour exploitation, in-
cluding human trafficking, forced labour, and domestic servitude (FRA, 
2015; GLA, 2015). Most national and supranational governments have in-
tegrated these offences into their domestic criminal-legal codes, either as 
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stand-alone offences, or as part of broader legislation. However, modern 
slavery represents just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the exploitation contin-
uum, since not all manifestations experienced in the workplace count as 
‘slavery’, or are even severe enough to be subject to criminal prosecution. 
There are numerous practices which do not meet such high thresholds, but 
which could still be considered as exploitative in some form. It is here 
where definitional (and legal) problems of ‘labour exploitation’ begin to 
emerge: labour exploitation has no universally agreed definition, either at 
the national or international level. While ‘modern slavery’ also has no in-
ternationally agreed definition, its subsets of human trafficking and forced 
labour (among others) tend to be referred to as severe exploitation (FRA, 
2015). 
 As a means to find some balance between the narrowly defined forms 
of severe exploitation on the one extreme, and the Marxist ‘omnipresence’ 
of exploitation on the other, Scott (2017) has advanced a definition of ex-
ploitation that consists of excessive workplace ‘control’. While acknowl-
edging that some form of workplace control is necessary and helpful to an 
extent, he argues that when this becomes excessive, labour exploitation and 
so harmful consequences result. ‘Excessive’ control is categorised into 
three key areas – direct, indirect, and exogenous controls, broadly referring 
to interpersonal (inter)actions, processes occurring at the organisational 
level, and dynamics of societal factors respectively (Scott, 2017). These 
controls are now unpacked further for the sake of clarity. 
 Direct controls, which could otherwise be loosely referred to as ‘micro’ 
factors, refer to individual interactions in the workplace, primarily between 
employers, managers and employees, that could facilitate harm. For in-
stance, airline cabin crews have reported concerns that their employers 
have pressured them into working longer hours than stipulated in their con-
tracts without appropriate pay to compensate, as well as charging recruits 
for their uniforms (Boyle et al., 2017). These practices are also likely to be 
found in manual, low-wage work such as agriculture, food processing, and 
construction, due to the fast-moving nature of these industries (EHRC, 
2010).  
 Indirect controls, alternatively viewed as the ‘meso’ level factors, refer 
primarily to processes that occur at the organisational level, including 
workplace culture and decision-making procedures. There is a significant 
literature that discusses how decisions are made within organisations (e.g. 
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Braithwaite, 2017; Gobert, 1994; Passas, 2005), many of which can have 
adverse consequences on workers. On the one hand, individual managers 
or employers may pursue rogue actions that are outside the scope of the 
law – or at the very least, actions that are morally ‘dubious’. On the other, 
structures within an organisation or even the entire industry may shape in-
dividual perceptions and actions. Individual employees may consider ac-
tions that others in similar positions have taken in order to inform their own 
decisions (Gobert and Punch, 2003). For example, new businesses in the 
UK construction sector continue to encourage workers to register as self-
employed, which is a widespread industry practice, despite this being 
linked to harmful labour practices such as underpayment (FLEX, 2018). 
 Exogenous or ‘macro’ controls refer to broader societal factors associ-
ated with markets, as well as political, economic, and legal structures, in-
cluding immigration and welfare regimes. In the case of undocumented 
migrant workers, for example, it is possible that strict border controls and 
a lack of opportunities to enter a destination country by legal means re-
sulted in them seeking entry via irregular means. A consequence of this 
irregularity is that they have no official documentation, which encourages 
them to remain ‘under the radar’ by working without a contract, being paid 
in cash, and potentially relying on others for help with accommodation – 
all of which make workers more vulnerable to exploitation and harm. Other 
examples of exogenous controls may refer to the dynamics of product and 
labour supply chains/networks, which are discussed in the next section.  
 While Scott’s (2017) definition of labour exploitation begins to move 
beyond the confines of the legal system. This is done in the spirit of the 
social harm agenda discussed in the previous section, which allows crimi-
nologists to examine harms that are not part of criminal law state defini-
tions as represented through legal interventions. The risk of pursuing such 
a loose ‘harm’ agenda that moves beyond the confines of formal sanctions 
is that advocates are accused of ‘moralising’ or at the very least, adopting 
a less scientific approach (Tappan, 1947). Nevertheless, a harm approach 
provides the opportunity for criminology to remain relevant in ‘grey areas’ 
where demarcations between legal, illegal and criminal actions are not 
clear-cut, amid accusations that it is limited when addressing ‘non-crimi-
nal’ harms (Scott, 2017). 
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 As part of this emphasis on the full spectrum of exploitation, there are 
a number of limitations with the modern slavery agenda which risk over-
looking a number of key factors. For instance, it is usually only the most 
severe, ‘newsworthy’ and ‘outrageous’ cases of exploitation that are por-
trayed in the media, rather than the more mundane, repetitive, and less se-
vere exploitation.  
 There are a number of caveats to this, since public bodies and the media 
have recently been paying greater attention to standard business practices 
which may be harmful to workers, including the ‘gig economy’ and zero 
hours contracts, which are both associated with insecure, flexible work 
(Taylor, 2017). 
 It is common to identify individuals who are responsible for patterns of 
criminal and harmful behaviour. In cases of modern slavery and labour ex-
ploitation, it may be relatively straightforward to identify individual per-
petrators, especially in the more sensationalist cases. As part of this, there 
is a particular emphasis on ‘rescuing’ victims from these malicious perpe-
trators, thereby potentially generating an incomplete depiction of the prob-
lem. Instead, the notion of ‘victims, villains, and rescuers’ is easy to un-
derstand and has popular appeal (Anderson, 2015), whereby a malicious 
perpetrator causes harm to an innocent (female/child) victim; hence, the 
state intervenes in order to rescue the victim and punish the perpetrator. 
This is not to deny that there are malicious individuals who deliberately set 
out to exploit people for the sake of financial gain. However, such dis-
course has potentially damaging consequences for the way in which ex-
ploitation and its resulting harm is addressed. For instance, O’Connell Da-
vidson (2005: 420) asserts that the archetypal victim of human trafficking 
is depicted as a woman or girl (child) who is being sexually exploited by 
an individual with links to organised crime. In the 2000s especially, such 
a discourse on ‘ideal victims’ limited the attention on other abuses such as 
labour exploitation and the role of legitimate actors. 
 There are well-grounded reasons that pinning the blame on a small 
number of individuals for heinous crimes diverts attention from broader 
societal factors, including immigration and border controls, supply chains, 
and the political-legal context (LeBaron, 2015; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). 
In other words, while the state may indeed ‘rescue’ some victims from se-
vere exploitation, it is arguably contributing to the underpinning social 
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conditions that lead to exploitation in the first place, through its immigra-
tion controls and fragmented labour market regulation. For example, the 
UK has 13 different regulatory bodies that deal with different aspects of 
labour market enforcement, which is confusing for workers (Citizens Ad-
vice, 2017). In severe instances, once victims have been officially recog-
nised as victims of trafficking (through the National Referral Mechanism 
in the UK, for instance), the level of support provided to victims has a 
mixed track record (Home Office, 2014), to the extent that ‘re-traffick-
ing’is a significant concern in the event of limited support for victims. Re-
trafficking refers to someone who escapes, is ‘rescued’, or otherwise de-
taches themselves from the trafficking process, and ends up in similar vul-
nerable positions that expose them to the same process a second time, fre-
quently due to a lack of support from the destination country or their coun-
try of origin (Jobe, 2010). It is on this basis that researchers across disci-
plines have paid a strong level of attention to the role of businesses, supply 
chains and their oversight (e.g. Barrientos, 2013; EHRC, 2010; Potter and 
Hamilton, 2014) in order to develop more nuanced depictions of the prob-
lem. 
   
 
The role of businesses, supply chains and markets 
 
As noted in the previous section, focusing exclusively on individual per-
petrators may be helpful in the most extreme cases of labour exploitation 
where individuals are more easily identified. However, shifting the focus 
onto the role of businesses, their supply chains, and the otherwise legiti-
mate markets in which they operate, arguably provide a more comprehen-
sive explanation for how exploitation and harm occurs. Supply chains can 
be defined as a system of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, buyers (re-
tailers) and customers, where materials feed forward from suppliers to cus-
tomers, and demand feeds back from customers and buyers (Stevens, 
1989). In the agri-food industry, such an example can be seen with how 
growers purchase tomato seeds, before, planting, growing, and eventually 
picking the tomatoes. The products are then packed, transported to whole-
salers or buyers, before consumers purchase them from supermarkets, 
smaller grocers, or restaurants etc. 
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 However, in the case of food production, Croall (2012) argues that the 
economic context of the global food system is criminogenic, since it en-
courages a culture where profits are prioritised to the extent that deviant 
corporate behaviour is normalised. For instance, the research of Lord et al. 
(2017) found in the drinks industry that internal market actors played a key 
role in facilitating the tampering of labels (i.e. ‘best before’ dates), rather 
than being an exclusive problem of external criminal actors. Similarly, the 
2017 Grenfell Tower incident in London, where 72 people died in a fire 
that engulfed the building, highlighted serious concerns regarding corpo-
rations prioritising profit over appropriate building safety standards (BBC 
News, 2018). According to Ruhs and Anderson (2010), workers, far from 
being passive victims, may sometimes benefit from deviant corporate prac-
tices by colluding with employers. Their research found that migrant work-
ers who were legally resident in the UK colluded with employers to exceed 
employment restrictions associated with their immigration status in order 
to earn more money, whereby the lack of oversight in the supply chain 
helped to facilitate this (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). 
 By focusing on broader market and business factors, rather than just 
criminality, the issues under consideration begin to move beyond the tra-
ditional confines of criminology and the criminal justice system, which in-
tegrates well with a harm-based approach in order to more fully understand 
how and why labour exploitation occurs. This section begins by consider-
ing some key issues in relation to increasingly standard business practices, 
including precarious work and subcontracting, while examining important 
economic sectors where these processes have resulted in harm, including 
agriculture, food production, education, healthcare, and hand car washes. 
 Corporations and organisations more broadly have frequently been 
identified as hotspots for deviant and criminal activity by critical criminol-
ogists (e.g. Box, 1984; Gobert and Punch, 2003; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). 
According to this body of work, organisations provide the motivation, the 
opportunity, and the means for deviant behaviour that can harm employees, 
the interests of the organisation, consumers, the public, as well as the en-
vironment. This is frequently conceptualised and applied to case studies 
within the areas of organised crime, state-corporate crime, white-collar 
crime, and green criminology (Gray and Hinch, 2018; Paoli, 2014). Inci-
dents ranging from oil spills, faulty car manufacturing, food production, 
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consumer fraud, air pollution, and more recently, harm to non-human ani-
mals, have all been important focal points in these spheres of interest. For 
example, the impacts of climate change on farming and sustainable pro-
duction have recently been a subject of focus for researchers (e.g. White 
and Yeates, 2018). In terms of labour conditions, there have been important 
developments, especially since the 1970s, that have shaped increasingly 
common workplace practices. 
 Many economic sectors, especially in Europe and North America, have 
been affected by various developments associated with neoliberalism. Ne-
oliberalism is strongly associated with privatisation of industries, deregu-
lation (or a lack of regulation), flexible working conditions, stricter immi-
gration and welfare regimes (LeBaron, 2015), as well as a stronger empha-
sis on individual responsibility. Part of this process is sometimes referred 
to as Fordism and ‘post-Fordism’ (Melossi, 2003), whereby the former rep-
resented an era of mass industrial production, full employment, and stable 
work. The latter tends to represent post-industrial production that is in de-
cline and fragmented across numerous countries, as well as precarious and 
flexible employment that does not guarantee a stable income or ability for 
workers to plan their lives in the long term. 
 Interlinked with these post-Fordist conditions is the rise of globalisa-
tion, where supply chains and networks have significantly expanded and 
become more complex (Barrientos, 2013). As part of this process, farmers 
and producers at the beginning of the chain, who are frequently (though 
not exclusively) in the Global South, have faced increasing price pressure 
and deterioration of profits due to the buying power of larger, multi-na-
tional corporations who buy their products for distribution and sale in the 
Global North (LeBaron et al., 2018). Such dynamics are particularly ap-
parent in agriculture and food production, whereby farmers have seen a 
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of wages and general working conditions 
(Scott, 2017) due to the bargaining power of global firms that dominate the 
industry who increasingly price out smaller scale producers.  
 While some multi-national corporations have developed strategies to 
tackle the issue of modern slavery and ethical initiatives (New, 2015), not 
only have these approaches been criticised as superficial, but large buyers 
such as retailers may be several steps away from where exploitation and 
harm occurs at the bottom-end of supply networks, therefore arguably do 
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not fully understand the consequences of their decisions. For instance, de-
cisions made at the top-end of supply networks may be made with the best 
economic intentions in mind for the business and shareholders, without re-
gard to the impact that these decisions can have on workers who are fre-
quently based in other countries and occupy low-wage positions. An ex-
ample is the garment industry in Bangladesh, where the Rana Plaza col-
lapsed in 2013 due to poor safety standards and a lack of oversight, killing 
1,100 people and injuring 2,500 (CIOB, 2018: 8). 
 Despite some international bodies and movements, including the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) advocating improved working conditions across 
global supply chains/networks, these bodies have little formal authority. 
This remains largely with national states and regulatory frameworks, who 
have struggled to keep up with global developments in terms of their re-
sponses. Simply put, it is highly problematic for national governments to 
regulate global supply networks by themselves, due to the number of juris-
dictions that products may pass through from production to consumer 
shelves. However, aside from a small number of supranational frame-
works, such as the Council of Europe Convention on Trafficking, most 
states implement their own legislation in order to tackle labour abuse, 
which can vary widely between the confines of civil and criminal law. 
These regulatory concerns and forms of oversight are explored further in 
the next section. 
 
Workplace and industrial relationships 
 
Alongside the business and supply chain practices identified above, these 
have been accompanied by a gradual shift from collective organisation and 
bargaining to individual employment rights/contracts, in part due to the 
decline of labour movements since the late 1970s (Turner et al., 2014). In 
the UK context, trade union membership has gradually declined from al-
most 14 million to little more than 6 million between the late 1970s and 
2017 (BEIS, 2018). This has harmful impacts on workers, since they are 
less able to negotiate better working conditions as with individual employ-
ers. Thus, if workers are not part of trade union movements, which poten-
tially serve as a bulwark against exploitative workplace practices, then 
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workers are potentially less influential in improving their day-to-day work 
conditions. Such issues are prevalent in transport/taxi firms, as well as peo-
ple who work for (food) delivery companies, and construction workers, 
who are routinely denied full working rights due to their self-employed 
status (FLEX, 2017). 
 Third, and partly as a consequence of reduced trade unionisation, the 
growth of ‘atypical’ or ‘non-standard’ employment has increased during 
the last decade (Hipp et al., 2015). These concepts refer to work that is not 
full time, permanent, and not accompanied with various employment ben-
efits such as sick pay, holiday pay, and pension plans. Non-standard em-
ployment, therefore, consists of flexible, part time, temporary or seasonal 
work, often with very few or no employment benefits, especially if workers 
are employed through agencies or other labour market intermediaries. 
Some workers are even pressured to register as self-employed as a way for 
firms to avoid paying appropriate levels of tax and/or providing employ-
ment benefits such as paid sick leave (FLEX, 2017). Figures suggest that 
in the UK, this ‘precarious’ work has increased to affect up to 10 million 
workers (GMB Union, 2017). Hence, atypical and non-standard work is 
becoming increasingly typical and standard within labour markets. Has a 
new proletariat emerged?   
 While businesses (and governments) may cite the benefits of flexible 
contracts, including many workers ‘choosing’ flexible work, and demon-
strating that their companies can respond flexibly to ever changing market 
dynamics, such employment conditions can be associated with exploitation 
and harm. For example, workers who are employed on flexible contracts 
can be more easily dismissed than permanent employees, which potentially 
gives a greater degree of control to businesses, by denying workers rest 
breaks or toilet breaks, or ‘encouraging’ them to work harder and faster 
under the threat of dismissal should they fail to comply (EHRC, 2010). 
This issue integrates with the notion of labour subcontracting, whereby a 
business may hire workers from an agency on a temporary basis, in order 
to meet peaks in demand. Businesses can then easily discard these workers 
back into the ‘reserve labour pool’ once the peak of demand falls again, 
since they are not permanent employees of the business and so do not have 
to provide full employment benefits. Having said that, such issues are not 
new – van Duyne and Houtzager (2005: 165) point out that business sectors 
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such as construction, garment manufacturing, and horticulture have fre-
quently relied on cheap labour in order to manage the demands of volatile 
market conditions. 
 Fourth, there is a heavy reliance on migrant labour in key economic 
sectors. It should be stressed that, in the author’s view, increased migrant 
labour is not the cause of increased modern slavery or exploitation; nor is 
exploitation the cause of further migrant labour. Arguably, the post-Fordist 
conditions that have been building up over recent decades have far more to 
do with the issue of labour exploitation and harm than increased migration 
flows to destination countries, since these conditions affect all workers, 
especially those who occupy low-wage positions, not just migrants. There-
fore, while the issues of migration and labour exploitation are certainly 
connected and overlap: one does not cause the other. 
 
 
Regulatory oversight of labour exploitation and harm 
 
The question of how to tackle labour exploitation and modern slavery has 
long been a focal point for researchers, both in national and international 
contexts (LeBaron et al., 2018; Ollus, 2016). Arguably, single intervention 
will serve as a ‘silver bullet’ for exploitative practices; this point seems to 
be especially valid when addressing severe exploitation and labour abuse 
(France, 2016). Traditionally, there has been a focus on the ‘three Ps’, re-
ferring to prevention, protection and prosecution, which has had mixed re-
sults in terms of addressing root causes, victim protection, and offender 
prosecution respectively. However, these approaches potentially neglect 
the role of the state and businesses in facilitating exploitation, through 
(lack of) regulation of markets and business activities. A discourse of ‘res-
cuers, victims and villains’ is the result, which was alluded to above as a 
critique of the anti-trafficking framework. More recently, however, there 
has been a greater emphasis on alternative forms of oversight, including 
state regulation, labour inspections/audits, corporate social responsibility, 
and labour or trade union movements (Scott, 2017; Tombs and Whyte, 
2015). While all these issues cannot be covered with the rigour that they 
deserve here, a discussion of some key issues in terms of regulatory over-
sight is presented, with a particular focus on the UK context. 
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 Within and beyond criminology, there is an assumption that regulation 
and enforcement against deviant behaviour is difficult to ‘do well’ 
(Braithwaite, 2008: 62) due to the number of actors and processes that may 
be involved in given situations. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 35) develop 
a regulatory ‘pyramid’ in order to conceptualise different responses to 
criminal activity, especially in relation to businesses. 
 At the bottom-end of this pyramid, oversight is based on persuasion and 
negotiation between regulators and businesses, whereby responses gradu-
ally get harsher towards the top-end, progressing from warning letters to 
civil and criminal law intervention. As Almond and van Erp (2018) argue, 
it is here that interdisciplinary problems are apparent, because criminology 
tends to emphasise only the ‘top-end’ of this regulatory pyramid by focus-
ing on criminal law responses to deviance. On the other extreme, regulation 
tends to focus on the ‘bottom-end’ by emphasising meditation rather than 
punishment as the most constructive way forward. These points concerning 
the regulatory pyramid relate to harmful labour practices, since criminol-
ogy tends to focus on ‘top-down’ criminal law and criminal justice system 
responses to the most severe harm, while potentially overlooking other 
forms of ‘bottom-up’ intervention. These tensions are outlined for the rest 
of this section. 
 Police and criminal law involvement are clearly necessary, and some-
times lacking, in many cases of exploitation. Even in relatively well-pub-
licised cases that have identifiable individual perpetrators, this does not 
guarantee a criminal prosecution or conviction. A useful example in the 
UK is the DJ Houghton case, where a group of Lithuanian workers were 
transported to the UK and subject to severe forms of exploitation while 
working across different UK farms, including substandard accommoda-
tion, sleep deprivation, and withholding of payment (The Guardian, 2016). 
Although there was an initial police investigation into the employers (the 
Houghtons) and their associates, no criminal charges materialised, which 
resulted in the workers eventually securing financial redress through the 
civil courts, based on breaches of employment law. While the reason for 
the lack of a criminal charge was not explicit, there are suggestions that 
there was a lack of evidence to proceed, especially since one of the suspects 
could not be traced (The Guardian, 2016). In many respects his case gets 
to the heart of debate in terms of whether such events should be considered 
138 
 
as ‘crimes’ in the absence of criminal convictions (Sutherland, 1941; Tap-
pan, 1947). While it could be argued that the Lithuanian workers in this 
case were subject to exploitation and suffered harmful consequences, la-
belling the business owners as ‘criminals’ or their actions as ‘criminal’ is 
dubious, at least in legal terms. 
 Given the severity of the DJ Houghton case, this suggests that even 
where individual perpetrators seem to have a strong role in facilitating ex-
ploitation, securing a criminal conviction is far from a foregone conclu-
sion. Proving intent and linking the accused to specific actions beyond rea-
sonable doubt has long been an issue within the sphere of enforcing against 
corporate and white-collar crime (Gobert and Punch, 2003). Therefore, 
when considering the spectrum of exploitation and the ‘grey areas’ in be-
tween decent work and severe exploitation, involvement from the criminal 
justice system is even less likely (France, 2016). Instead, responses from 
civil law or specialist regulatory bodies may take a more prominent role, 
assuming that concerns of exploitation are reported in the first place. It is 
therefore possible that police and prosecution authorities are reluctant to 
press charges, especially if they lack the financial resources and legal ex-
pertise that are available to larger corporations. 
 Regulatory agencies are usually quasi-governmental bodies that have 
the authority and, especially over time, develop an area of specialism in 
order to investigate and potentially prosecute deviant behaviour within or-
ganisations and businesses. Given the problems associated with achieving 
criminal prosecutions, primarily around high thresholds of evidence and 
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, regulatory sanctions or investiga-
tions could be seen as an alternative, albeit less severe, form of accounta-
bility. However, such regulatory bodies may lack resources and ‘teeth’ in 
order to hold businesses accountable for harmful actions or omissions 
(Balch, 2012). This criticism is broadly directed at states who provide the 
remit and funding to these regulatory bodies, rather than taking care of the 
quality of work that such bodies do (although the former inevitably influ-
ences the latter to some extent). 
 Beyond the UK context, other countries present a mixed picture with 
regards to labour market enforcement. According to International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) recommendations, developed market economies (i.e. 
developed countries) should contain one labour inspector per 10.000 work-
ers (Weil, 2008: 351). However, many European countries fall short of this 
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standard, with the Netherlands and Poland having 0,5 and 0,8 inspectors 
per 10.000 workers respectively (FLEX, 2017: 24). Norway, in contrast, 
has 1,3 inspectors per 10.000 workers, which suggests significantly differ-
ing approaches towards labour market enforcement – although there are 
EU proposals to introduce a European Labour Authority in order to replace 
or reorganise existing regulatory structures (Kiss, 2018). These issues of 
inspection are problematic to examine in developing countries, some of 
which do not keep data on labour inspections or regulatory issues more 
widely (ILO, 2019). 
 Some countries have a more fragmented regulatory picture than others. 
The UK, for instance, does not have a single authority or ‘labour inspec-
torate’ that is responsible for regulating against exploitation. Instead, a 
number of fragmented organisations adopt specific roles, some of which 
may seem to overlap. The UK’s Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority 
(GLAA) regulate labour market intermediaries, traditionally in the agricul-
tural and food industries. The Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate 
(EASI) oversees employment agencies. In addition, the National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) team within HM Revenue & Customs oversee financial is-
sues related to contracts, such as tax payments and National Insurance con-
tributions. There have been some efforts to reconcile these numerous agen-
cies, each of which have different priorities and functions, by developing 
a common strategy, as seen with the Director of Labour Market Enforce-
ment (HM Government, 2018), who works closely with the GLAA, EASI, 
and the NMW team. Such a fragmented regulatory context therefore argu-
ably has advantages and disadvantages, through the specialism gained 
from focusing on a limited number of areas, but at the expense of a unitary 
authority with a single set of goals. 
 Other countries have a less fragmented regulatory regime. Finland, for 
instance, has the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
which is the main authority responsible for monitoring work conditions, as 
well as health and safety (EU-OSHA, 2019). Therefore, countries that con-
tain a national unitary ‘labour inspectorate’ may find it easier to develop 
labour market enforcement strategies, rather than having multiple organi-
sations who each have responsibility either for particular stages of labour 
use (e.g. recruitment), or for particular sectors (e.g. agri-food). 
 Given the limits of criminal law and state regulation, the notion of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) as a form of ‘self-regulation’ has 
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emerged as an alternative to the traditional binary ‘regulator-regulated’ re-
lationship. Since organisations are in a prime position to facilitate but also 
resolve harmful workplace practices, there is a question of to what extent 
they should be permitted to regulate themselves, and what consequences 
this has on accountability when harm occurs. However, as is well discussed 
in other literature (New, 2015; Tombs and Whyte, 2015), the key counter-
argument to CSR is that businesses will tend to prioritise profit over ethical 
social practices if they are unable to do both. Given that businesses are 
legally obligated to maximise profits for their shareholders (Fauset, 2006), 
this generates significant tension – and from a harm perspective, the mate-
rial interests of shareholders could be harmed if the business chooses to 
pursue a more expensive social-ethics programme. However, the issue of 
labour exploitation is increasingly becoming a high-profile issue across 
many countries and sectors, which means that businesses risk significant 
reputational damage (and even criminal charges) if they are seen to neglect 
responsible practices in their supply chains (CIOB, 2018: 6). This is by no 
means a fool-proof protection, but represents one example of the important 
role that businesses have in addressing exploitation in their supply chains. 
 With the development of modern slavery and labour exploitation, and 
the role that businesses can play in facilitating these practices, a large num-
ber of businesses have been keen to emphasise the role that they can have 
in preventing such practices. Most large companies have some form of la-
bour ethics statements that are publicly available, and more recently in the 
UK, now publish an annual ‘transparency in supply chains’ document, in 
line with the requirements of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This annual 
publication sets out the measures businesses have taken to identify ‘slav-
ery’ in their supply chains, and what they are doing to resolve the problem. 
However, such legislation applies only to larger businesses whose annual 
turnover exceeds £36 million which means that smaller companies are ex-
cluded from this remit, even though significant exploitation may occur in 
these smaller companies. In addition, the legislation focuses exclusively on 
severe forms of exploitation, including human trafficking and forced la-
bour, while neglecting ‘less severe’ abuses that fall into the grey area be-
tween ‘decent work’ and violations of criminal-legal codes. 
 Aside from CSR, there are numerous labour movements and workers’ 
rights advocates groups who aim to encourage workers to be more proac-
tive in challenging workplace conditions through mutual support. As noted 
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in the previous section, trade union membership has been in decline for 
some time (BEIS, 2018), and the efficacy of unions in the workplace has 
been questioned (Potter and Hamilton, 2014). The likelihood of increasing 
union membership in the context of flexible work practices and transient 
working populations remains a significant uncertainty in this area. How-
ever, the number of charities and similar groups in the UK has expanded 
in recent years – many of them adopt the ‘anti-trafficking’ agenda and tend 
to focus on improving victim’s rights and protection. These ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches towards improving workplace conditions are fragmented, lo-
calised, and focus on particular groups, but in the long term, such commu-
nity-based responses may be constructive ways forward as part of a broader 
package involving stronger state regulation in order to oversee organisa-
tions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that scrutiny of workplace and supply chain con-
texts that place workers in vulnerable positions result in a wide range of 
harmful practices. As Anderson (2010: 313) notes, it is important to under-
stand such practices not just as a product of rogue employers, but also of 
the markets in which they operate. This begins to move away from discuss-
ing harm as a problem of individuals to one of businesses, supply chains, 
markets, and the political-legal contexts in which they operate (Scott, 
2017). In order to make such a move, the value of a harm approach is a 
helpful lens through which to view harmful practices that are neither crim-
inalised nor prosecuted, since numerous harms occur that are hidden within 
organisations or market relationships. While labelling all these practices as 
criminal is problematic, there are grounds to assert that they can be harmful 
to workers and wider society. 
 Through this lens of harm, it is critical to focus on the full spectrum of 
labour exploitation, rather than the most severe forms usually categorised 
as human trafficking, forced labour, and modern slavery (Davies, 2018; 
France, 2016). More subtle cases and ‘grey areas’ that fall in between the 
notions of ‘decent work’ and severe exploitation are neglected, yet these 
arguably merit attention, especially if working conditions deteriorate and 
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encourage further exploitation to occur. Part of this process involves shift-
ing attention from rogue employers and human ‘traffickers’ towards a 
more rigorous understanding of how decisions are made and overseen in 
contemporary industries. 
 In some cases, decisions made within businesses may not be intended 
to cause exploitation or harm to others; instead, they are likely doing what 
they think is right for their business within the context of competitive en-
vironments. However, decisions to subcontract labour or to use flexible 
employment contracts frequently have unintended consequences, such as 
confusion for workers whom to report concerns to. Workers who are easily 
hired and fired tend to be less willing or able to speak up against unfair 
treatment. More complex supply chains that extend over numerous coun-
tries may also make oversight and regulation problematic. Where there is 
oversight, there are contradictions and limitations associated with top-
down responses such as criminal law, as well as bottom-up responses in-
cluding trade union and labour movements. 
 Regarding future impacts in the European context especially, estimat-
ing the full impacts of Brexit would be highly speculative at this stage, and 
may not be known for a number of years – signposting these issues may 
serve as a springboard for further work in future. In particular, concerns 
around migrant workers’ rights, work shortages in migrant dependent sec-
tors such as agriculture, and labour market enforcement, are all subject to 
ongoing debate (France, 2017). However, if EU-wide enforcement bodies 
such as the European Labour Authority come into existence, aligning the 
regulatory systems of different countries may prove challenging, especially 
given significant approaches towards labour inspection. 
 These issues all point to a large amount of complexity with regards to 
the features, organisation and control of harmful labour exploitation. There 
are a number of disciplines that examine these issues in the context of local, 
national and global supply chains. However, criminology is perhaps 
‘guilty’ of overly focusing on state based and criminal justice system in-
terventions, while neglecting a broader range of harms that occur within 
and beyond the workplace. Although this chapter does not advocate ‘aban-
doning’ criminology in favour of a social harm discipline, it is clear that a 
more rigorous assessment of supply chains and business practices within 
the dominant capitalist system would provide advantages to the discipline 
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in terms of broadening its approach and developing contemporary solu-
tions. 
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